Korea’s Birth Rate
- Jacob Sung
- Mar 30
- 3 min read

On the outside, South Korea seems to be the hub of development in Asia, as its financial and innovative feats are outstanding. Yet, a greater underlying problem threatens the wealthy empire South Korea has built–its declining birth rate.
The birth rate has been a parasitic problem, tugging at South Korea since 1983 and fully maturing in 2003. Still, South Korea has never seen this crisis reach such a magnitude. Alarmingly, South Korea’s fertility has reached an all-time low of 0.78 births per woman in 2024, which is minuscule compared to the global average fertility rate of 2.4 births per woman. This implies a net-negative population, meaning the overall population is predicted to decrease throughout the future. Furthermore, the number of babies born annually dropped to 249,000 in 2024, which was significantly less than the number of recorded annual deaths of 372,800.
The repercussions of such low birth rates are silent yet deadly. By 2050, it is projected that over 40 percent of South Korea’s population is predicted to be over 65. The quantity of such an aged population entails economic unproductivity, as they cannot be physically and mentally as productive and able to work compared to younger generations. As such, due to the contracting workforce, South Korea's GDP growth rate is estimated to drop by 2 percent annually. Moreover, pension systems will face greater demand but less revenue and supply. With fewer workers to pay taxes to support the increasing costs of a pension system that has to pay for the livelihoods of more, the system, experts predict, will most likely go into debt and be unable to accommodate the needs of the elderly.
The factors that fuel the birth rate crises are twofold. First, there are huge economic pressures where average house prices in Korea skyrocketed during COVID-19, and high education costs, including private education such as hagwons, serve as a financial strain, especially for low-income families. Hence, couples of lower financial status are unlikely to be able to accommodate all their family's needs.
Secondly, there are changing societal norms, where women prioritize work commitments instead of having children. Recent generations of Korean married couples have trended toward prioritizing their advancement in society over having a baby. Oftentimes, working couples simply do not have the capacity to handle raising a child; corporations that a lot of South Koreans work in have overreaching demands – demands that couples are not confident in fulfilling while handling the baby’s duties simultaneously. When the tradeoff becomes clear as to one’s career over a family, the fruitful generation will prioritize the career.
Due to these excessive responsibilities that would potentially require the sacrifice of their well-being, couples tend to stray away from marrying or raising a baby.
As the problem worsens exponentially, it is imperative to devise a solution. For instance, the government invested heavily in family subsidies, providing up to 10 million Korean Won per child annually for daycare and education support. They have also provided paid and mandatory paternity and maternity leave in some instances by negotiating with employers.
It is crucial, however, to recognize that these solutions have shortcomings that may render the entire system futile. There are structural problems rooted in gender norms, the desires of couples, and the trends of younger generations that will not be dissolved with such governmental solutions.
The future for South Korea is unclear, yet mostly certainly not bleak, for the results of South Korea’s innovative solutions are yet to be manifested. Innovation and progress wait to be unlocked. The government may have the key, but the real solution is in the will of the people.
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